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THE GENIE AND THE BOTTLE: COLLATERA L
SOURCES UNDER THE SEPTEMBER llTH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND

Kenneth S. Abraham*
Kyle D. Logue**

INTRODUCTION
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund)
was part of legislation enacted just eleven days after the terrorist at
tacks of September 11th in the wake of extraordinary national loss.1 It
is possible, therefore, that the Fund will always be considered an ur
gent and unique response to the unprecedented events of September
11th. On that view, the character of the Fund will have little long
term policy significance. It is equally possible, however, that the en
actment of the Fund will prove to be a seminal moment in the history
of tort and compensation law. The Fund adopts a new model for com
pensating loss of life. This model will inevitably be invoked as a stan
dard against which other approaches may be measured, and it may
well be employed again in the event that we experience another major
terrorist attack on American soil. Thus, with respect to this new
model of compensation, there is a sense in which the genie may be out
of the bottle: What the Fund did will have to be considered whenever
new approaches to compensating personal injury and illness are
contemplated.
This prediction raises an obvious initial question: What about the
Fund's approach to compensating losses is new? The answer depends
on what the Fund is compared to. But regardless of the yardstick, the
Fund breaks new ground. In one sense the Fund is unusually gener
ous. For example, the Fund can be viewed as an innovative alterna
tive to tort liability, analogous to workers' compensation or auto no
fault insurance, that pays more generous benefits than these systems
but (of course) to a more narrowly defined set of beneficiaries. Simi*
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Class of 1966 Research Professor,
University of Virginia School of Law.
**
Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law.
1. The Victims Compensation Fund was enacted as part of the U.S. Air Transportation and
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A
§ 40101 (West 2003)) (hereinafter Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act].
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larly, the Fund can be seen as a new type of government�provided life
insurance, along the lines of social security survivorship benefits, but
again with more generous benefits and fewer beneficiaries. Under ei
ther view, for those who happen to be beneficiaries of the Fund, from
one standpoint they are treated extraordinarily generously. Indeed,
for those who qualify for an award, the Fund comes closer to provid
ing a full compensation measure of recovery than any non-tort com
pensation regime ever adopted in this country.
From another standpoint, however, the Fund is not only not gener
ous, but stingy in a way that defies all precedent. Although the bene
fits paid by the Fund exceed those available under existing non-tort
compensation regimes, these benefits cannot compare to what one can
obtain in a tort recovery, given the possibility of large noneconomic
and punitive awards in some tort cases. But tort is universally under
stood to be more generous in this respect than any of the vast array of
available compensation alternatives. Therefore, a compensation alter
native to tort, such as the Fund, cannot j ustifiably be accused of being
parsimonious merely because it pays less than a successful tort claim
ant would receive.
But compared to other non-tort regimes, there is a sense in which
the Fund is unusually stingy. The Fund contains a provision requiring
that claimants' benefits be reduced by the amount of any compensa
tion for September 11th-related-losses that the claimant has received
or is entitled to receive from collateral sources, including life insur
ance.2 Neither tort nor any significant non-tort source of compensa
tion for lost life in this country requires a collateral offset for life
insurance. Moreover, unlike most other types of insurance, which vir
tually always employ some type of "coordination" or "other insur
ance" clause to allocate an insured's losses among various insurers in
situations in which the insured has multiple sources of coverage, life
insurance never requires such an allocation.3 Instead, life insurance is
paid on top of all other benefits. For this reason, the interaction be
tween the collateral offset provision of the Fund and the provisions of
standard life insurance policies is unique. Instead of victims' life in
surance being paid to claimants on top of other benefits, the amount
of life insurance received by claimants is deducted from the benefits
paid to them by the Fund.
2. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(6), 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101
(West 2003). For discussion of collateral sources, see Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Harm in
the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1839-40 (2002).
3. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 710, 737 (3d ed. 2002); Ros.
ERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. Wrn1ss, INSURANCE LAW 227 (1988).
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Although the treatment of collateral sources both within and
outside of tort is generally an obscure subject, that treatment can have
significant implications for distributive justice, corrective justice, and
deterrence. The offsetting of Fund payments by life insurance recov
eries appears to reflect a special sensitivity to avoiding double-or at
least over-compensation of losses created by September 11th. But
as we will attempt to explain, the Fund's treatment of collateral
sources generally, and of life insurance in particular, strikes a balance
among competing considerations that is far from simple.
The salience of the events of September 1 1th has resulted in an un
precedented amount of publicity about, and public attention to, the
way in which victim recoveries are calculated under the Fund. Much,
perhaps even most, of this publicity and attention have been focused
on the treatment of collateral sources. Thus, a topic that until recently
was obscure even for many tort scholars has become a matter of gen
eral public debate. In this Article we explore the issues that have
arisen out of the Fund's treatment of collateral sources and speculate
about the significance of these issues for tort and compensation sys
tems more generally. Our aim is not to resolve these issues, but to
analyze them and identify their implications. In this sense this Article
might be seen as a first step in the development of a broader theory of
the proper treatment of collateral sources in any liability or compen
sation system.
II.

B ACKGROUND ON TH E FUND
A.

The Forces in Play

The Victim Compensation Fund was enacted at an extraordinary
moment in this country's history. To understand how the Fund and its
collateral offset provisions were intended to function, we must first
understand the principal forces that lead to the enactment of the Fund
and the U.S. Air Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization
Act of which the Fund is one part. There appear to have been three
major considerations that gave shape to this new type of compensa
tion regime.
1.

Full Compensation

In the immediate aftermath of September 11th there was an enor
mous outpouring of public sympathy for the victims of the attacks and
their families. They were perceived as having made a sacrifice for
their country, rather than merely being the victims of a disaster. This
perception was manifested in a desire to see the victims' families fully
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compensated for the financial losses caused by the death of their loved
ones, despite the potentially enormous cost of doing so. Evidence of
this desire can be seen, among other things, in the unprecedented
magnitude of the charitable response to September llth.4 Not only
did the terrorist attacks give rise to the largest wave of charitable giv
ing in modern U.S. history, it also became quite clear that the donors
were intent on having their gifts go to the victims of the September
11th attacks, even after organizations such as the Red Cross deter
mined that those needs had already been met.5 This full compensation
imperative was immediately influential in Congress. It is reflected in
the rhetoric used by members of Congress during deliberations on the
bill.6 And the Fund itself is responsive to this imperative. The Fund
provides for the compensation of both economic and noneconomic
losses and, as enacted, contains no limits on the total amount of com
pensation that can be provided for either type of loss.7
The extent to which this full-compensation imperative was opera
tive also can be appreciated by comparing the benefits available from
the Fund with those paid by other nontort compensation schemes. In
virtually every other scheme the goal seems to be to provide not full
compensation but only minimal welfare. For example, the death ben
efit payable under a typical workers' compensation system is a maxi4. The American Red Cross's Liberty Disaster Relief Fund received roughly $1 billion in
donations in the year following the attacks, approximately $800 million of which was expected to
have been distributed by the end of 2002. Press Release, American Red Cross, American Red
Cross Releases Sept. 11 Report (Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.redcross.org/press/dis
aster/ds_pr/020905report.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
5. In October 2001, the Red Cross stopped seeking donations for September 11th victims,
saying that it had received more money than it could use. See David B arstow & Katharine Q.
Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Red Cross Halts Collections for Terror Victims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at B l O; Corey Kilgannon, A Nation Challenged: Donations; Red Cross
Offers to Refund Gifts for Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, N ov. 12, 2001, at B l l .
6 . Representative James Turner (D-Tex.) made the following statement:
Mr. Speaker, I want to address these remarks to the families of the victims, those who
were injured on September 11.
One of the best provisions of this bill is that this Congress has provided a method
whereby all those injured, the victims of those who have died, will have full recovery for
their economic and noneconomic damages by the establishment of a special master. The
Treasury of the United States has been opened by the Members of this Congress to ensure
that every family will receive just recovery. It is one of the best provisions of the bill,

and I urge my colleagues to support it.
147 CoNG. REc. H5906 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added).
7. The regulations promulgated by the Special Master pursuant to the Act do place a pre
sumed limit on the amount of noneconomic damages that may be recovered from the Fund,
based on the number of dependent survivors of a victim. See 67 Fed. Reg. 11,239 (Mar. 13, 2002)
(limiting compensation to $ 250,000 plus $50,000 for any spouse and each dependent).
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mum of roughly $20,000 per year;8 under the Federal Black Lung Act
that benefit is a maximum of about $12,000 per year;9 family members
of military personnel killed in the line of duty receive $250,000;10 and
the maximum survivor benefit under the Social Security program is a
relatively small fraction of the deceased workers' average lifetime
earnings.11 In short, as compared to the death benefits available
under workers' compensation and federal compensation programs,
the benefits payable by the Fund are extraordinarily generous.
2.

Tort Protection for the Airlines

With the airlines facing possible bankruptcy in the aftermath of
September 11th, they needed both financial backing from the govern
ment and some degree of protection against tort liability for the al
leged security failures that may have made the attacks possible. The
Act gave them the former and the adoption of the Fund gave them the
latter, though only indirectly. The indirect protection from tort liabil
ity came by virtue of the Fund's largely successful effort to provide a
nonmandatory, but generally acceptable, alternative to seeking com
pensation through tort suits.
Although the benefits available under the Fund are generous com
pared to other non-tort compensation regimes, the amount of any
8. The majority of states determine death benefits as a percentage of the deceased worker's
average weekly wage. Most states have a maximum payment per week and a maximum period
during which survivors may collect. 5 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORK
ERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 98.02 (2002). For example, New York pays 66 2/3% of the em
ployee's wage up to a maximum of $400 per week during the term of widowhood and to children
until the age of eighteen. Florida pays 50% of the employee's wages to a spouse only or 66 2/3%
of the employee's wages to a spouse and children up to a maximum of $594 per week. Idaho
pays 45% to a spouse only or 60% to a spouse and children up to a maximum of $ 315.60 per
week for up to 500 weeks. For a complete listing of state worker's compensation death benefits
for surviving spouses and children see id. at app. B -65.
9. The B lack Lung B enefits Act, codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (2000), provides "benefits,
in cooperation with the States, to coal miners who are totally disabled due to p neumoconiosis
and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such disease." 30 U.S.C.
§ 901. Effective January 1, 2001, the basic monthly benefit for a totally disabled miner or his or
her surviving spouse is $500.50. This may be increased to a maximum of $1001 per month for
claimants with three or more dependents. B enefits are reduced by payments made for workers
compensation. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT LAw GumE: BLACK LUNG COMPENSATION
(2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide/blklung.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2003).
10. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (2000).
11. STAFF OF HousE CoMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CoNG., 2o SEss., 1998 GREEN BooK
15 (Comm. Print 1998). For deceased workers with "average" or lower levels of qualifying
wages, the income replacement rate provided by Social Security survivor benefits can be over
50%, depending on how many dependents are left and how many years of Social Security wages
the deceased had earned. For above-average wage earners, the replacement percentage is much
lower. Id.
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given claimant's benefits are nonetheless likely to be smaller than
what could be obtained in a successful tort suit, in which huge non
economic and punitive damages are at least potentially available. The
difference, of course, is that recovery in tort is much less certain than
obtaining benefits from the Fund. To secure a tort judgment, a plain
tiff would need to identify and obtain jurisdiction over a defendant or
defendants whose conduct, both factually and legally, satisfied the ele
ments of a tort cause of action (duty, breach, causation, etc.). In con
trast, the only serious question arising in a claim made by an eligible
party against the Fund is the amount of economic damages suffered. 21
Hence, discounting potential tort recovery for the possibility that the
plaintiff might recover nothing, the benefits payable by the Fund seem
at least comparable to tort, and probably a better bet for the risk ad
verse claimant.
This degree of comparability was politically necessary for two rea
sons. First, any compensation system designed to be an alternative to
tort is inevitably evaluated by reference to what is available in tort.
Because the proposal was to make recovery from the Fund an alterna
tive to tort at the option of the claimant, Congress could anticipate
that the Fund's benefit structure would necessarily ·be compared to
tort damages. Consequently, Congress could not safely depart too
radically from the tort benchmark. As so often happens, the nature of
tort liability and the scope of the damages that are recoverable in tort
tended to constrain what could be done in creating an alternative to
tort. 13 Thus, Congress faced the challenge of fashioning a benefit
structure that would be a departure from tort law's measure of dam
ages but nonetheless would be j udged in the public mind by reference
to what the claimant could have obtained in tort. Nevertheless, by
making recovery from the Fund automatic for any eligible party, and
thereby eliminating much of the uncertainty inherent in bringing a
tort claim, Congress left itself room to provide something less than
"full" tort damages in return for relieving claimants of the burden of
proving third-party wrongdoing in order to secure recovery.
12. In some cases, however, this question may turn out to be very much in dispute. For exam
ple, Cantor Fitzgerald, which occupied floors 101 through 105 of the north tower of the World
Trade Center, lost 658 of its roughly 1,000 employees who worked in the building. See Submis
sion of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., eSpeed, Inc., and Tradespark L.P. to the Special Master of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and to the Department of Justice 5 (Sept.
12, 2002) available at http://www.cantorusa. com/vcf/DOJsubmission.pdf ( last visited Oct. 18,
2003). The firm's brief argues that the Special Master's proposed approach to the compensation
of economic loss threatens to undercompensate the families of deceased employees.
13. See Walter B lum and Harry Kalvan, Jr., Ceilings, Costs and Compulsion in Auto Compen
sation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 343 (1973).
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Second, it was not only the reaction of the public at large with
which Congress had to be concerned. The Fund also had to be attrac
tive enough to the victims and their families that, at least prima facie,
they would perceive it as providing an acceptable alternative to tort.
Otherwise, potential claimants would have rejected the Fund alter
native outright. Then the nation would have been faced with the
prospect of an immediate cascade of lawsuits against American busi
nesses-airlines, security companies, the World Trade Center design
ers, and others-seeking to hold them liable for the results of
September 1 1th. In the aftermath of September 1 1th that would have
appeared unseemly and unpatriotic. The nation was in the process of
pulling together to fight terrorism; the sort of recriminations within
the "family" that would have been produced by lawsuits were to be
avoided, if at all possible. The particular members of the family most
in need of protection would seem to have been the airlines. Recall
that the Fund was part of the Air Transportation and Safety and Sys
tem Stabilization Act (the Act), whose primary purpose, as its name
suggests, was to shore up the airline industry, which was hit harder by
the events of September 1 1th than any other single industry (perhaps
including the insurance industry). 41 The Fund held out the hope that
the airline industry and the country would avoid the spectacle of tort
litigation over the scope of American entities' responsibility for the
attacks.
3.

Avoiding Overcompensation

Another political factor that influenced the terms of the Fund was
the desire to avoid overcompensation. There are two senses in which
claimants could conceivably be overcompensated. First, the size of
some individual awards might be seen as excessive. Because many of
the victims earned sums in the top one-half to one percent of national
income, if there was no ceiling on the amount that could be recovered
from the Fund, or if the norm of full compensation were applied, the
Fund would end up paying some truly extraordinary awards. This
concern, however, appears not to have had much influence in the de
sign of the Fund. In fact, no upper limit was imposed on the awards.
14. In addition to creating the Fund, the Act, among other things, authorized the transfer of
$5 billion in cash and $10 billion in loans to the airline industry. Also, it limited the airlines' tort
damages from September 11th to the amount of their outstanding liability insurance coverage.
See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §408. A subsequent
Act of Congress extended this liability limitation to any "aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor,
or person with a property interest in the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001, whether
fee simple, leasehold or easement, direct or indirect, or their directors, officers, employees, or
agents." Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 646 ( 2001).
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There was a suggestion that, in the implementation of the Fund, the
Special Master might impose a "soft cap" on awards through a "pre
sumed award" procedure. 15 As was made clear in the final regula
tions, however, although there may be presumed awards, the Special
Master does not intend to impose an absolute ceiling on awards, but
plans instead to make awards based on the "individual circumstances
of the claimant" -a plan that seems to imply an intention to ensure
that there is full compensation. 16
The risk of a second type of overcompensation, however, seems to
have been more of a concern. Some Fund beneficiaries would also be
receiving large life insurance or pension payouts triggered by the
death of their loved ones. In such cases, if no offsets were made for
these collateral sources of compensation, the total amounts received
by those families could actually exceed the families' financial (though
obviously not their nonfinancial) losses, or at least could involve very
substantial sums. It is easy to imagine that lawmakers would have
wanted to avoid the possibility that some families would become (or
be perceived as becoming) wealthy as a result of the September 11th
tragedy. This sort of concern is not unique to September 11th. Fed
eral disaster relief generally, whether in the form of loans or outright
grants, is available only for uninsured losses.17 The political reason
for this limitation is clear: public support for disaster relief would
wane quickly if there were stories in the media of victims actually
profiting from a disastrous event. A desire to avoid this type of over
compensation almost certainly contributed to Congress' s decision to
insert the collateral offset provisions in the Fund.

15. 67 Fed. Reg. 11,236-37 (Mar. 13, 2002). The presumed award is based on a formula that
takes into account, among other things, the age and income of the victim. Under one of the two
available claim "tracks," an e ligible claimant can seek a preliminary determination of her pre
sumed award, which she can then either accept or reject, in favor of an individualized hearing.
The notion of a soft cap arose from the fact that, according to the Special Master, the presumed
award calculations would be made under an assumption that none of the September 11th victims
had incomes higher than the ninety-eighth percentile of national income (around $225,000). This
assumption is of course counterfactual in more than a few cases, as a sizeable number of victims
had incomes in the top .5 to 1% of national income.
16. "To be absolutely clear: The fact that the 'presumed awards' address incomes only up to
the [ninety-eighth] percentile does not indicate that awards from the Fund are 'capped' at that
level. " Id. at 11,237. If this is so, however, one wonders why the Special Master bothered with
the "presumed award" approach in the first place. Perhaps the idea is to encourage the use of
the presumed awards in order to minimize the administrative costs of individualized hearings.
But that story would seem to support the soft cap characterization.
17. For e xample, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides assistance
for "uninsured or under-insured, necessary expenses and serious needs." 44 C.F. R. § 206.110
( 2002). Assistance to insured individuals and households is strictly limited. Id. § 206.113.
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In sum, these three political considerations-full compensation, an
attractive alternative to tort, and avoiding overcompensation-helped
to shape the Fund as it was enacted by Congress, and as it was imple
mented through the regulations promulgated by the Special Master.
This is especially true of the collateral offset provisions, which we
summarize in the next section, and then evaluate in the remainder of
the Article.
B.

The Fund's Treatment of Collateral Offsets

Although the language in the Act that sets up the Fund is relatively
terse on the issue of collateral offsets, its meaning is unmistakable.
Congress clearly intended to reverse the traditional treatment of col
lateral sources, across the board. The Act provides that the Special
Master awarding compensation "shall reduce the amount of compen
sation . . . by the amount of the collateral source compensation the
claimant has received or is entitled to receive as a result of the terror
ist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 .18 The term "collat
eral source" is then defined to mean "all collateral sources, including
life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments
by Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 ." 19
This was among the most controversial provisions in the Act, and
even the objections generated objections. Some commentators have
railed against the collateral offset provision on the ground that it
would mean that some families of September 11th victims would re
ceive little, or perhaps nothing, from the Fund.20 That result struck
many as especially unfair, given that the collateral offsets would have
the greatest effect on the families of those victims who happened to
have planned ahead (or whose employer planned ahead) and pur
chased insurance, a group that included the families of the firefighters
and police officers who died while attempting to rescue others. At the
same time, however, some commentators have expressed serious con
cern over the problem of overcompensation (discussed above) and,
explicitly or implicitly, offered arguments in favor of the collateral off
set provisions.2 1
18. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 4 05(b)(6).
19. Id. § 402(4).
20. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Worst-Hit Firm Faults Fairness of Sept. 11 A id, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2002, at Al ; Jon S. Corzine. Letter to the Editor, Fix the Victim's Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2002, at A14; Elissa Goolman, Seeing Families, Senator Calls for Changes in Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at B 2.
21. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Families of Victims Rally for Higher Federal Awards, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B4 (noting postings on the Victim Compensation We b site expressing
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In his comments accompanying the final regulations implementing
the Fund, the Special Master attempted to make clear that he was
taking both of these competing concerns into account, though empha
sizing that Congress had, in important respects, tied his hands by man
dating collateral offsets.22 Thus, although Congress had listed several
types of compensation that would have to be considered collateral
sources-importantly, including life insurance proceeds-that list was
not exclusive. As a result, the Special Master could be viewed as hav
ing some discretion in defining what would count as a collateral source
and what would not, how to calculate the value of the benefits payable
by the collateral source, and under what circumstances the availability
of payment from a collateral source would be considered too specula
tive to be taken into account.
The final regulations accepted the Congressional mandate every bit
as far as it expressly extended but exempted from the category of
"collateral source" a variety of payments or potential payments about
which reasonable people might disagree. Thus, for example, the Spe
cial Master defined the term collateral source not to include amounts
received as charitable contributions, a decision that seems consistent
with the statute but certainly was not required by it.23 In addition, he
excluded from the definition certain tax benefits, such as the income
and estate tax breaks made available to September 1 1th victims under
the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 .2 4 Also, because the
collateral benefits provided under the Social Security survivorship
program as well as under some workers' compensation programs are
contingent on future events, such as a surviving spouse's not remarry
ing, the Special Master decided to require an offset only for those benconcerns about "greedy people when it comes to the distribution of funds to the victims of Sep
tember 11"); Editorial, The Victims' New Referee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at A26 ( suggesting
that the Victim Compensation Fund could i ncorporate a "ceiling . . . to prevent obscenely large
awards. ").
22. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13,
2002) (codified at 28 C.F. R. § 104 ( 2003)). The Special Master stated:
As I have repeatedly stated to the victims and their families, there are many aspects of
the fund that are mandated by Congress and cannot be changed by me or by the De
partment. Indeed, many of the most controversial aspects of the Fund-such as the
requirement that awards be offset by life insurance and other collateral source compen
sation-are specifically required by Congress.
Id.

23. This decision may have been a response to the worry that firefighters and other rescue
workers would otherwise receive too little compensation because the families of fallen rescue
workers seem to have been the primary beneficiaries of charitable contributions. See Stephanie
Strom, Survivors of Firefighters Ask to Look into Union Charity. N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at B7.
24. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427.
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efits that have already been received by the claimant.25 In addition,
he made a decision not to include any element of personal savings as a
collateral source, whether it be in the form of a savings or self-funded
pension account or in the form of accumulated surrender value within
a cash value life insurance policy.26 The unstated rational here seems
to be that, at least with respect to the particular form of government
provided life insurance represented by the September 11th Fund, indi
viduals will not be expected to have self-insured.27
This last exemption of various forms of savings and investment from
the definition of collateral sources is of special significance, because
the exemption highlights the difference between compensation based
on loss and compensation based on need alone. As we will show be
low, as far as the Fund does go in attempting to base compensation on
loss, it stops short of basing compensation on need alone. In doing so,
it avoids both the practical and the philosophical problems that would
be entailed in prescribing means-tested recoveries.
III.

EVALUATING THE FUND'S COLLATERAL OFFSET PROVISION
A.

Coordination, Subrogation, and Collateral Sources

In order to evaluate the Fund's collateral offset requirement, it is
necessary to understand the two available approaches to handling col
lateral sources in tort cases generally. The traditional approach,
adopted by a majority of states, is to reject collateral offsets (this ap
proach we call collateral nonoffsets); whereas a minority of states re
quire collateral offsets of tort awards to take into account various
types of non-tort compensation, not including life insurance.28 The
choice between these approaches is intertwined with the doctrine of
subrogation and the function this doctrine performs in coordinating
sources of coverage in both insurance and tort law.
1.

Coordination of Insurance Coverage

The entire coordination issue derives from the fact that private in
surance products and social insurance regimes have proliferated in the
modern American economy. Insurance is now available to cover a
25. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,241 (Mar.
12, 2002) ( codified at 28 C.F. R. § 104 ( 2003)).
26. Id. at 11,234. He will also ensure that there are no offsets if those to whom life insurance
or pensions are paid are not the parties receiving compensation from the Fund. Id.
27. This may be another manifestation of the full-compensation norm discussed above, to
which we will return later in the Article.
28. As mentioned in the introduction, the Fund takes this minority collateral offset approach
and, in an unprecedented move, expands it to offset life insurance proceeds as well.
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variety of risks to health, life, property, and income. As a conse
quence, there is an ever-increasing possibility of overlapping insur
ance coverage for any given loss. First, different types of policies may
overlap. For example, the medical costs associated with a personal
injury may be covered under portions of an individual's homeowner's
policy, automobile policy, and employer-provided health insurance
policy. Workers' compensation or Medicare may also figure into the
equation. 29 Second, multiple policies of the same type may provide
overlapping coverage. For example, two spouses and their family
members may both be covered by health insurance afforded as a
fringe benefit by their respective employers. In a very real sense, the
Fund, too, is a source of first-party insurance that overlaps with bene
fits paid to claimants by collateral sources.
Despite these overlaps, providing policyholders with insurance in
excess of their losses would violate the principle of indemnity, which
holds that insurance is designed to protect against loss, not to make
gain possible. This is a principle that runs through all of insurance
law.30 To prevent payment in amounts that would violate this princi
ple, a patchwork system of insurance coordination that allocates cov
erage responsibility among potential insurers has evolved. Coverage
is coordinated so as to specify which insurer or insurers pay, and in
what proportions, when more than one policy provides coverage of a
loss that does not exceed the sum of the coverage provided by all
available policies.
The goal of a system of coordination need not merely be to ensure
that the principle of indemnity is not violated; coordination can per
form other functions as well. From the standpoint of loss prevention,
for example, primary coverage responsibility should be assigned to the
insurer with the greatest capacity to combat moral hazard on the part
of the insured. Alternatively, if moral hazard is of comparatively little
concern (or if no insurer has much capacity to combat it), the insurer
best situated to bear primary coverage responsibility may be the one
most able to minimize administrative costs or to distribute the risk in
question most broadly, depending on the system's goals.
Our system of insurance coordination is implemented through a
combination of market and legal mechanisms. 3 1 The market mecha
nisms include insurance policy provisions expressly allocating insuring
responsibility among insurers whose policies overlap. These provisions
29. See id. at 133-34.
30. Id. at 137; JERRY, supra note 3, at 295.
31. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUB
LIC POLICY 148 ( 1986).
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are sometimes called "other-insurance" or "coordination of coverage"
provisions. 32 Versions of them can be found in virtually every type of
insurance policy, except, interestingly, life insurance. Coordination
clauses of this sort attempt to specify which insurer or which policy is
to be primary (that is, which will cover the first dollars of insured
losses) and which will be secondary (which will cover what is left
over).
It is not uncommon, however, for such market mechanisms-con
tractual coordination provisions-to fail by themselves to produce ef
ficient or desirable risk allocation among the insurers in question. 3 3
This i s because it takes two to coordinate, so to speak. For example,
market forces, if left alone, can lead to a situation in which two insur
ance policies that purport to cover a given risk also contain "other
insurance" clauses that, if read literally, result in no coverage
whatever. That is, each policy has a clause making the other policy
the primary insurer. 3 4 In such _situations courts are called upon to har
monize conflicting coordination provisions, which sometimes means
ignoring these provisions and specifying new rules of coordination. To
avoid such conflicts altogether, regulatory authorities sometimes re
quire insurers to insert standardized (and therefore consistent) coordi
nation clauses in their policies.
Thus far we have discussed coordination as if the only form of insur
ance in play were first-party insurance-that is, insurance purchased
by or for those who suffer loss themselves. A broader conception of
coordination, however, would also comprehend third-party, or liabil
ity insurance, as a source of coverage for such loss. The typical suc
cessful tort claimant, after all, is likely to have received compensation
for some of his or her losses from collateral sources, such as health
and disability insurance, and yet, also to have a right of access to the
tort defendant's liability insurance after settlement or judgment. The
rules governing how the collateral sources will be counted-whether
they will be offset against a tort award or not-can be understood as
the means by which first-party and third-party insurance is
coordinated.

32. Id at 148-57.
33. Id. at 157 ("Because market devices mainly make use of bilateral contracts to achieve
coordination, their capacity to reflect the multi lateral character of the insurance arrangements
they create is limited. ").
.
34. See, e.g., B lue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. v. Riverside Hosp., 703 P.2d 1384 (Kan.
1985) (holding that coordination of coverage provisions in two health insurance policies were in
conflict).
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Subrogation as Coordination

The doctrine of subrogation is central to the way in which first-party
and third-party insurance have traditionally been coordinated and the
way in which the principle of indemnity has traditionally been served.
Subrogation is the process by which one party is substituted for an
other party relative to the latter's rights against a third party. Through
subrogation, an insurer in effect " steps into the shoes" of the insured,
succeeding to whatever legal claims that insured may have against
third-parties responsible for the insured's loss.
The insurer in that case is said to be "subrogated to" the insured's
rights to sue the third party. The authority for this transfer of rights is
found either in an explicit subrogation clause in the insured's policy
(which can be found in almost every first-party insurance policy, ex
cept life insurance) or in the judicially created doctrine of equitable
subrogation, which in effect makes a subrogation clause an implied
term in virtually every type of non-life first-party insurance.35
The traditional collateral source rule, which rejects collateral offsets
and permits the plaintiff in a tort suit to recover compensation from
the defendant for losses that have been or will be paid by collateral
sources of insurance, is actually a method of vindicating first-party in
surers' subrogation rights. That approach, among other things, is what
the Fund rejected. To see how the traditional approach to collateral
sources works, consider a simple example. Suppose that Sarah is in
jured by Michael. Sarah's hospital and medical expenses may be paid
by her first-party health insurer, such as B lueCross. If so, then, owing
to either the subrogation language in Sarah's BlueCross policy or the
state's equitable subrogation doctrine, BlueCross will become subro
gated to Sarah's tort rights against Michael to the extent of its prior
payment to Sarah.36 BlueCross typically will not, however, exercise
this subrogation right directly in an action against Michael. Rather,
subrogation will occur indirectly, through the insurer's exercise of a
right to subrogation via reimbursement by Sarah out of her recovery
from Michael.37
Thus, subrogation acts as a coordination device. However, instead
of allocating insurance responsibility among first-party insurers, as
35. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 192-93 (3d ed. 2000).
36. Id.
37. This ideal, however, is not always realized in practice. For example, insurers may not mon
itor ongoing tort actions with sufficient care to vindicate their subrogation rights when actions
settle or go to judgment; when cases settle, the amount of the insurer's right of reimbursement
may be indeterminate. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
216-18 (2d ed. 2002).

2003]

THE GENIE A ND THE BOTTLE

605

other-insurance clauses do, subrogation (working together with the
collateral source rule) allocates coverage responsibility between first
party insurers and tort defendants and their liability insurers.
Through subrogation, the defendant or its liability insurer bears ulti
mate coverage responsibility for the plaintiff's loss. That is why,
under the traditional nonoffset collateral source rule, if an injured per
son receives compensation from a source other than the tort defen
dant (such as a first-party insurer), in a subsequent tort suit against the
defendant the jury is not allowed to hear evidence on, or in any way
take into account, the amount of this collateral compensation.
That is also why the traditional collateral-nonoffset regime ideally
has the effect of making the defendant or its liability insurance com
pany the primary insurer of a plaintiff's medical expenses. However,
when a defendant has no liability insurance or is judgment proof, the
health insurer has no way to vindicate its subrogation rights and ends
up bearing the cost of the policyholder/plaintiff's medical expenses as
a kind of secondary insurer. In addition, many courts apply what is
sometimes called a "make-whole" rule, under which an insurer cannot
be subrogated to its insured's rights against a tortfeasor unless the in
sured has been made whole.38 Under this rule, subrogation rights are
limited when the insured has recovered or settled for less than his or
her full losses.
In contrast to the traditional nonoffset/subrogation approach, under
a collateral offset rule of the sort adopted by statute in a number of
states following the liability "crises" of the 1970's and 1980's-and like
the approach adopted by the Fund-awards are in fact reduced by the
amounts of first-party insurance proceeds already received or payable
in the future.39 Under these statutes (as under the Fund), the plain
tiff's total recovery from the defendant is offset by payments received
or receivable from collateral sources. The collateral sources, in turn,
typically have no subrogation rights to vindicate and are not reim
bursed out of the plaintiff's recovery, which, after all, does not include
the sums paid by collateral sources. Collateral sources such as health
insurance (and in the case of the Fund, life insurance) thus become
the primary course of compensation under a collateral offset regime.
Under such a regime, if the medical expenses the plaintiff incurs ex
ceed the limits of (or are not otherwise covered by) health insurance,
or if the plaintiff incurs noneconomic losses, those losses are still cov38. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 711-14. See infra Part III.D.2. (further discussing the make
whole issue).
39. For discussion of these statutes, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races:" The
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Haus. L. REV. 207, 217-23 (1990).
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ered by the plaintiff's "secondary" insurers-namely, the defendant
and its liability insurer.
Thus, the collateral nonoffset and collateral offset approaches each
coordinate coverage and thereby prevent overcompensation, but they
do so differently. The former allocates primary coverage responsibil
ity to tortfeasors and their liability insurers. The latter allocates pri
mary coverage responsibility to first-party insurers. The choice
between the two approaches depends on which type of insurance one
regards as more efficient or otherwise appropriate with respect to a
particular type of risk. For instance, the efficiency question turns on
which allocation of responsibility would provide the best overall risk
reduction incentives (and thus would produce the least moral hazard)
and which would provide the best means of risk spreading. The an
swer to this question will often come down to one's views on the effec
tiveness of the threat of tort liability in a given context as a deterrent.
Thus, for example, the prospect of tort liability and its effects on auto
liability insurance premiums probably has little effect on individual
driving behavior. 40 Given the inherent risks associated with driving,
and the potential incentive effect of first-party auto premiums, it
seems unlikely that tort law significantly enhances safe-driving incen
tives. If that intuition is sound, it would suggest that the optimal ap
proach to collateral sources for auto-accident cases would be the non
traditional collateral offset rule, which would leave auto risks to be
insured by first-party insurers (and might even eliminate the need for
costly tort suits). 41 One might well have a different intuition as to the
potential deterrent effect of product liability lawsuits, a conclusion
that supports the traditional nonoffset approach to collateral sources.
B.

The Strange Case· of Life Insurance and
the Principle of Indemnity

To the extent that the Fund will operate as an insurance mechanism,
it will function primarily as a form of life insurance. This is so because
the vast majority of the payouts will be to the families of the almost
3,000 victims who died in the attacks. However, whereas every other
type of insurance includes an explicit (or judicially provided implicit)
subrogation right or coordination provision, life insurance policies tra40. For discussion of the studies addressing this issue, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L REV. 377, 393-97
(1994).
41. Indeed, this is a principal rationale for and effect of the move to auto no-fault compensa
tion regimes in many states.
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ditionally do not contain such provisions.42 Indeed, life insurance is
the type of insurance with respect to which neither insurers, insureds,
nor the law has sought to coordinate coverage so as to avoid overcom
pensation. In the absence of an express subrogation provision in a life
insurance policy, it is clear (though there is little law on the point) that
the courts will not permit equitable subrogation by the insurer, as they
would, for example, in the case of property insurance.43 And as a
matter of practice, insurers never insert such clauses in their policies.
The origins of this rule and the corresponding practice are not clear
but may have originated from the (probably inaccurate) supposition
that life insurance is not indemnity for lost income but a way of as
suaging grief.44 Because the grief felt over the death of a loved one
could never be fully assuaged, the theory went, a policyholder could
not be overcompensated by recovery of both life insurance and a tort
judgment.45 This theory was probably reinforced by the now-abol
ished limitations on the scope of damages recoverable for wrongful
death, including the non-recoverability under some statutes of any
damages whatsoever for emotional loss.46 Once these limitations were
in place, they were difficult to alter. To permit equitable subrogation
by life insurers the courts would have been required to overrule long
settled precedent. And any insurer that attempted to insert a subro
gation provision in its policy would have found itself at a distinct pub
lic relations disadvantage when it attempted to enforce the provision
against, for example, a sympathetic widow.
In any event, the general rule in tort law with respect to collateral
sources from life insurance-even in the minority states that have
adopted collateral offsets for most types of collateral sources-is that
tort awards are not to be reduced by life insurance proceeds. Thus,
using our example from above, if the accident involving Michael and
Sarah had resulted in Sarah's death, then Sarah's family would have
been able to recover not only the proceeds of her life insurance policy,
42. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 710; KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 3 at 227.
43. See, e.g. , Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
M1cH. L. REV. 841, 845 (1962) ("In life insurance, there seems little doubt that, absent contrac
tual stipulation, subrogation would be denied uniformly. Dicta are plentiful, but no cases actu
ally decide the matter. ").
44. See, e.g., George Steven Swan, Subrogation in Life Insurance: Now Is the Time, 48 INs.
COUNS. J. 634, 635 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Mich. Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 63 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Mich. 1955) (Reid, J., dissent
ing) ("There seems to be little doubt that a life insurance company cannot recover of one who
has caused the death of an insured the amount which it has thereby been compelled to pay. ")
(quoting 29 AM. JuR. 1003-04) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Kimball & Da
vis, supra note 43, at 851.
46. Kimball & Davis, supra note 43, at 859.
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assuming she had such a policy, but could also have brought a wrong
ful death claim against Michael without any offset for the life insur
ance proceeds. 47 As a result, depending on a number of factors
including Sarah's income, the amount of her life insurance, her rela
tionship with her dependents, and the amount of the wrongful death
recovery-Sarah's family might have been, in a purely financial sense,
"overcompensated" for Sarah's death.
Of course, to say that life insurance, as it is used today, is not about
indemnity is to indulge in a fiction. When a household decides to
purchase life insurance on the lives of the income earner or earners in
the household, the whole point is to insure the dependents (for exam
ple, the surviving spouse and any young children in the household)
against the possibility that earning power will be prematurely lost.
"Premature death" in the life insurance context means dying before
the time at which the dependents either would be expected to fend for
themselves or would have sufficient savings built up to replace the
earning power of the deceased breadwinner. Put this way, in terms of
insuring earning power or human capital, life insurance begins to look
a lot like disability or even property insurance, and the indemnity con
cept seems at least arguably relevant.
Moreover, one of the most important manifestations of the princi
ple of indemnity-the insurable interest requirement-does in fact
apply to life insurance. This doctrine holds that individuals may
purchase coverage only against contingencies that will actually cause
them to suffer a loss and only to the extent of those potential losses. 48
The obvious reason for having an insurable interest requirement in
life insurance is essentially the same as in other types of insurance.
47. See, e.g., McKinney v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849 (Ct. App. 2002);
B ell v. Estate of B ell, 885 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1994); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E . 2d 890
(S C. 1989); RONALD HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (1964).
48. JERRY, supra note 3, at 296-310. The rules governing what precisely constitutes an insura
ble interest (such as whether there must be a "legal interest,"-a contract right, in the item
insured-or whether, instead, a "factual expectancy" of some return from the insured item is
sufficient) vary from state to state. Id. The insurable interest requirement is essentially the same
for both property and life i nsurance, with a number of key qualifications. Id. at 310-16. For
example, with life insurance taken out on one's own life, or on the life of a close family member,
there generally is no doctrinal limit on the amount of coverage that can be purchased. This is i n
contrast t o property insurance, where the i nsurable interest doctrine limits coverage to the
amount of one's economic interest in the property being i nsured. However, with life insurance
contracts, insurers themselves impose limits on the amount of coverage they will provide. Thus,
we would be surprised if a life insurer would be willing to sell a policy on an i ndividual's life that
greatly exceeded a reasonable estimate of that individual's human capital value. What is impor
tant for the purposes of this Article is that insurance law-for both life insurance and property
insurance-generally seeks to avoid circumstances in which losses to life or property result in
windfall gains to insureds.
.
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The requirement seeks to minimize the especially egregious form of
moral hazard that would arise if individuals were permitted to
purchase life insurance policies that could generate net economic gain
for them.49
For all these reasons, and contrary to conventional wisdom, there is
a sense in which the principle of indemnity does in fact apply to life
insurance. Nevertheless, the doctrine of subrogation clearly does not.
With the liberalization of wrongful death statutes to permit recovery
of emotional losses suffered by survivors, we must ask why. Perhaps
the best explanation is still that nonsubrogation is necessary to com
pensate for the problem of underinsurance. That is, a case can be
made that individuals and households generally buy too little life in
surance.50 Although there is a conceptual and normative difficulty in
determining precisely what the "right amount" of life insurance is (an
observation that will become important below in our evaluation of the
Fund), there is substantial empirical evidence to support the claim
that the lives of primary earners within households tend to be under
insured.51 Moreover, there are cognitive reasons why we might expect
this to be so-simple myopia, an unwillingness to face one's mortality,
distaste for dealing with life insurance agents, and even fear of having
one's blood drawn during a physical exam.
If most households have too little life insurance, then also allowing
them to bring wrongful death actions without having to share the pro
ceeds with a life insurer will, to some extent, counteract this underin
surance problem. The approach achieves this effect, however, in a
way that is sometimes underinclusive and sometimes overinclusive. It
is underinclusive in that many households that are underinsured do
not have the benefit of a wrongful death claim; and it is overinclusive
in that some households that do have such claims will not have been
49. There is also a low-level anti-wagering concern here that is separate from the m oral haz
ard concern. Although we are generally skeptical of anti-wagering justifications for the principle
of indemnity and the insurable interest requirement (given that many states allow various types
of gambling and some even have state run lotteries), there would undoubtedly be something
untoward about allowing individuals to bet on when someone in whose life they have no per
sonal or economic interest will die.
50. Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2001).
51. B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET AL., THE ADEQUACY OF LIFE INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM
THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SuRVEY (Nat'! B ureau of E con. Research, Working Paper No.
7372, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7372 (last visited Oct. 18. 2003). Accord
ing to this study, if their spouses died in 1992, almost one-third of wives and more than 10% of
husbands would have suffered living standard reductions of 20% or more. Id. at 3. The authors
also found that underinsurance tends to be more common among low-income households,
couples with asymmetric earnings, younger households, couples with dependent children, and
non-whites. Among some groups, the frequency of underinsurance exceeds two-thirds. Id.
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underinsured. In these latter situations there is, at least theoretically,
a moral hazard and the corresponding problem of wagering on death.
Thus, there is a tradeoff between the problem of the overinsured and
the problem of the underinsured, although we suspect that the latter is
of greater concern than the former. Perhaps the biggest weakness
with the argument that seeks to justify double-indemnity for wrongful
death on grounds of underinvestment in life insurance generally is
that there are any number of policy tools that might more effectively
respond to the problem. For example, instead of allowing double re
covery for certain tort plaintiffs, Congress might enact a new tax
break for all who purchase life insurance or for those in the categories
of people whom we believe to be most at risk. In the extreme, Con
gress might even increase the amount of government-provided life in
surance offered through the Social Security Survivorship program.52
Any such approach could be made both more precise and more com
prehensive than simply allowing double-recovery for those whose
loved one happens to have been killed by a negligent tortfeasor.
In sum, we do not necessarily defend the traditional collateral-non
offset/nonsubrogation approach to wrongful death claims and life in
surance proceeds. Indeed, a consistent recognition that life insurance
is primarily about indemnity for lost earning power would suggest ei
ther a nonoffset/subrogation approach or a collateral-offset approach.
However, we can at least see what the argument for the offset/subro
gation approach is-one based on a claim of underinsurance. What
we argue in the next section is that such an argument would have no
application in the September 11th setting and, therefore, to allow the
double-recovery approach would clearly have been a bad idea. Thus,
the central question for the design of the Fund's collateral source rules
becomes this: Which approach to preventing double-recovery makes
the most sense? Is it a collateral-nonoffset/subrogation approach,
which is traditional for most tort claims but would be radical and un
precedented for wrongful death cases? Or is it the collateral-offset/
nonsubrogation approach, which the Fund adopted and which also is
unprecedented for wrongful death cases and life insurance proceeds?
C.
1.

The September 11th Fund as Life Insurance and the
Collateral-Nonoffset Alternative

The Irrelevance of Underinsurance

If there is a case for allowing some degree of double-recovery in the
typical wrongful death tort action on the grounds of systematic under52. See Logue, supra note 50, at 37-61.
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investment in life insurance, that argument, such as it is, would not
apply to the Fund. This is not because every individual who died in
the September 11th attacks had adequate life insurance. To the con
trary, many almost certainly did not. If the conclusions of recent re
search on life insurance coverage holds true, then many of the
younger heads of households who died in the attacks had too little life
insurance, or none at all.53 Rather, the point here is that payouts
under the Fund are so generous that there will not likely be a wide
spread problem of undercompensation for September 1 1th caused
deaths. To put the point more directly, except in cases of victims at
the very highest income levels, the Fund payouts will come close to
providing full compensation for lost income due to September 1 1th
caused deaths, although obviously no human life can ever be replaced
with money. Moreover, the per-person level of (in effect) govern
ment-provided life insurance provided by the Fund is much greater
than the amount that most individuals carry on their lives. For this
reason, it did make sense for Congress either to include in the Fund a
collateral-offset provision of the sort that was included or not to in
clude such a provision but to grant life insurers (and other collateral
sources) a subrogation right against Fund payouts. In theory, either
approach could lead to full compensation while preventing double in
demnity. The interesting question is which approach is better. That is
the question to which we now turn.
2.

The Irrelevance of Deterrence

First, let us do away with one argument that generally favors the
collateral-offset approach, which again is the majority rule for most
tort claims. Recall that the cost-internalization benefit of tort law de
pends on the coordination provided by collateral-nonoffsets and sub
rogation. Only with a system of nonoffsets and subrogation can the
injury costs ultimately be shifted to tortfeasors and their liability in
surers through the tort system, which in turn leads (in theory) to opti
mal investments in accident avoidance. It is this promised benefit of
tort-induced deterrence that is typically cited as the justification for
the large administrative cost differential between the tort system and
a no-fault system of insurance. If, for whatever reason, there is no
deterrence benefit from this cost-shifting, then the administrative
costs of the tort system are not justified, at least not on deterrence
grounds. Again, this is the primary argument that has been made in
53. See BERNHEIM ET AL, supra note 51.

612

D EPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:591

favor of the switch from a fault-based to a no-fault auto-insurance
regime.
With this argument in mind, the question arises whether there is any
deterrence benefit to be gained in the September 11th context by a
cost-shifting from first-party life insurers to the federal government, as
a collateral non-offset approach would do. And the answer is almost
certainly no. In the September 11th setting, deterrence through tort
law seems largely irrelevant. The institution that has been made fi
nancially responsible for the September 11th deaths-the United
States government-is not a tortfeasor in the class of those who can
be deterred in the future by tort law. The government is a third-party
that already, without any inducement from tort law, has every incen
tive to prevent such attacks in the future. (Witness the amount of
federal tax dollars already being spent on reducing the risk of terrorist
attacks.) Rather, the situation here-involving private life insurers of
various sorts and the federal government as life insurer-bears a
much closer resemblance to a traditional first-party insurance coordi
nation problem (as in the case of first-party health or disability insur
ance policies) than to a subrogation problem. Hence, the issue is
whether private life insurance companies should be the primary insur
ers, with the federal government secondary, or vice versa. That is,
there is no deterrence rational for choosing one over the other, espe
cially insofar as the collateral-nonoffset alternative would likely have
entailed higher overall administrative costs.54
3.

The Distributional Question: Who Should Bear the Losses
Life Insurers or Taxpayers?

The most important question in deciding between the offset and
non-offset approaches is one of distributional justice: To what extent
should the financial losses produced by the deaths of nearly 3,000 peo
ple on September 1 1th be borne by private insurance companies, their
shareholders, and perhaps their reinsurers; and to what extent should
those losses be borne by the United States government, that is, the
United States taxpayer? Again, because of the generosity of the Fund
payouts (owing to the full compensation norm discussed above), and
54. The higher administrative costs would have come from the need for a process by which life
insurers would have sought subrogation payments from the federal government. If we assume a
no-fault regime (again, because of the absence of any deterrence goal), then such a subrogation
process could have been relatively inexpensive, that is, in comparison with a typical tort suit
against a private party. However, it seems likely that such a process would be less efficient than
simply having the Special Master do the collateral offset determination as part of his overall
decision about the size of the award. Certainly there is no compelling administrative-cost sav
ings from the non-offset approach.

2003]

THE GENIE AND THE BOTTLE

613

because of the likely underinsurance problem among the victims of
the attacks, taxpayers would bear some of this burden under either
regime; however, the nonoffset/subrogation approach would have
greatly increased this drain on federal tax dollars and would have es
sentially eliminated the September 11th liability of life insurers. The
argument for such an approach would go something like this: The
September 1 1th attack was directed at the entire country and not just
New York City, or j ust a group of individuals in New York City-and
certainly not at the particular insurance companies who end up bear
ing most of the costs under the collateral offset approach. Thus, the
argument concludes, compensation for September 1 1th related losses
should be funded as broadly as possible across the United States
population.
We would reject this argument for two reasons. First, and very sim
ply, the collateral offset approach, in contrast with the nonoffset/sub
rogation approach, is consistent with contractual obligations assumed
by the insurance companies when they sold life insurance policies to
the victims of September 11th and their families. Each of those poli
cies, like all life insurance policies, almost certainly contained a prom
ise to pay a given death benefit in the event of the insured's death
(upon the presentation of a death certificate) whatever the cause. That
is to say, life insurance policies, unlike' many other types of insurance
policies, contain very few exclusions. So long as the incontestability
period (almost always two years) has passed and the insured does not
die by suicide within a given period after the issuance of the policy,
the death benefit will be paid. There are no questions having to do
with the number of "occurrences"55 or, typically, whether the loss oc
curred during a "warlike action by a military force,"56 as there might
be for property insurance. Thus, we suspect that there have been very
few, if any, attempts by insurance companies to deny death claims
arising out of September 11th, except in the cases of fraud-for exam
ple, when an individual falsely claims to have lost a loved one in the
attacks or falsely claims that a lost loved one was insured. Besides
those cases of fraud, insurers are almost certainly paying the claims
with no objections, both for contractual reasons and for public rela
tions reasons.57 And this is as it should be: the collateral offset ap55. See SR Int'! B us. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL1163577,
at el (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003) (addressing whether attack(s) on the World Trade Center consti
tuted one or two " occurrences" for purposes of construing property insurance policies.).
56. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 1068-69 (discussing wartime exclusion and its application to
September 11th).
57. Additionally, even the fraud defenses to coverage will be lost once the incontestability
period has elapsed.

614

D EPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:591

proach-which makes the life insurers the primary insurers of the
human capital lost on September 11th-gives the life insurers pre
cisely the benefit of their bargain. To go with the nonoffset/subroga
tion alternative would have amounted to having the American
taxpayer pick up a debt that rightly belongs to the life insurance
industry.
Second, if we were to decide that the cost of September 1 1th caused
deaths should be borne by taxpayers generally (perhaps because of
the notion that the attacks were directed at the nation as a whole), a
much more radical departure from past insurance practice would be
called for than merely adopting a nonoffset/subrogation approach to
collateral sources. If Congress were to take such an argument seri
ously, the same rationale would apply to property losses. Those
losses, in monetary terms only, dwarfed the losses to human capital
associated with the September 11th attack. Thus, a move to truly "na
tionalize" the cost of September 11th and take it off the backs of the
insurers would have required a much more radical (and massively
more expensive) program than was adopted.58 The case for national
izing even more of September 11th losses than was in fact nationalized
seems difficult to make, given all of the many risks that we generally
leave for private markets to distribute. This conclusion holds despite
the fact that there have been reports of shortages of (or dramatically
increased prices for) insurance coverage for terrorism-related losses,
including life insurance.59 If the history of the insurance industry is
any indication, however, over the long run, as capital returns to the
reinsurance market and the hysteria from September 11th subsides,
the problems of insurance capacity for life insurance will subside as
well. In any event, unless one can tell a compelling market-failure
story concerning the market for life insurance for terrorism-related
risks (which we doubt), special government intervention-in this case
in the form of making the federal government the primary insurer of
terrorism-caused loss of life (which is what a subrogation approach

58. Most of the losses to property resulting from September 11th are expected to be covered
by private insurance, and what government relief will be provided-which will not be insubstan
tial is explicitly limited to those losses not covered by private insurance. Saul Levmore & Kyle
Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism-and Crime, M1ctt. L. REv. ( forthcoming 2003) ( discussing
relationships between private insurance, charitable relief, and government relief for September
11th losses to property and life) .
59. See id. at text accompanying notes 20-21 . There is some anecdotal evidence that reinsurers
are demanding that group life insurers either pay dramatically higher reinsurance premiums or
else include terrorism exclusions in their policies. Diane Levick , Life Insurers Want Safety Net,
HARTFORD CouRANT, Mar. 22, 2002, at El, available at 2002 WL 4798280.
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would in essence have done)-does not seem warranted.60 A thor
ough treatment of this question-of the appropriate degree of nation
alization of particular risks-is well beyond the scope of this Article.
We raise it here only to point out that, whatever the merits of the case
for such a nationalization of risk, it would be odd in the extreme to
choose only to nationalize the risk that had been contractually as
sumed by the life insurance industry.
D.

Defining Collateral Sources

Besides the questions (a) whether to allow double-indemnity for
loss of life (as the common law does in wrongful death cases, but the
Fund opted-for good reason-not to), and (b) which approach-col
lateral offsets or nonoffsets-plus-subrogation-is the best means of
avoiding double-indemnity, there remains the conceptually difficult
and morally fraught task of defining what counts as a collateral
source. Part of the job was done by Congress and part was left to the
discretion of the Special Master. Congress specifically said that "all
collateral sources" would be offset from the September 1 1th payouts,
and then it listed some of the most obvious categories of collateral
sources, including "life insurance, pension funds, death benefit pro
grams, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related
to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 1 1 , 2001."61
However, it was clear that Congress did not mean for this list to be
exhaustive. In the following sections we discuss some of the difficult
theoretical and practical issues raised in defining collateral sources.
1.

Collateral Sources and Savings: A Compensation-Based
Approach vs. a Need-Based Approach

The Special Master has attempted to draw a clear line between any
payment that looks like pure life insurance-compensation for lost
human capital-which will be considered a collateral source, and any
payment that looks like a withdrawal from savings, which will not be
considered a collateral source and, hence, will not be offset against
Fund payouts. This distinction is easy to draw in most cases. The pro
ceeds of a term life insurance policy are clearly a collateral source;
whereas, a personal savings account is clearly not a collateral source
under the Special Master's conception.
60. Fe: ::;; c;,;:cnJcJ Ji,rnssion oi the arguments for and against government intervention in
the terrorism-risk insurance market, see generally Levmore & Logue, supra note 58, at text
accompanying notes 51-63.
61. Air Transportation and System Safety Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 401(4).
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Drawing lines between savings and insurance, however, is not al
ways so straightforward. For example, it will be somewhat more diffi
cult to determine what portion of a death benefit from a cash value
policy is pure insurance and what portion is return of capital. A simi
lar distinction will have to be made with respect to certain types of
pension funds. Consistent with the savings and insurance distinction,
the Special Master has said that defined contribution plans such as
401(k) plans-in effect vested savings accounts that can only be
reached (without penalty) upon retirement-are to be treated as sav
ings. However, to the extent such retirement plans contain an ele
ment of pure term insurance, as some retirement plans do, that
amount must presumably be offset. Distinguishing between the por
tion of pensions that is insurance and the portion that is savings can be
difficult.
Similar measurement problems could arise insofar as September
11th victims have various forms of non-traditional life insurance. For
example, some individuals purchase life insurance that pays off their
mortgage in the event of their death. Presumably such payments
would be treated as life insurance offsets as well. A more difficult
line-drawing question is presented by those victims who owned some
form of double-indemnity life insurance, which pays double the nor
mal death benefit if the insured dies as a result of a specific listed
cause, such as an accident. Should such benefits be considered collat
eral source offsets, or only the part necessary to replace the individ
ual's earning power? Probably the former, but the answer is not
obvious.
All of these questions raise a more general issue regarding the Spe
cial Master's decision to draw a line between insurance and savings.
Putting aside measurement or line-drawing problems, why is it obvi
ous that such a distinction should be drawn? Why should collateral
source offsets include insurance and government benefits and other
forms of "compensation" for a given loss but not savings or wealth?
And the same questions could be applied not only to the Fund but
also to those tort j urisdictions that have adopted the collateral offset
approach. Ultimately, we conclude that offsets for savings would
probably not be a good idea-either in the Fund context or in the tort
context-but in this section we argue that the case against such offsets
for savings or wealth is not as open-and-shut as one might think.62

62. The arguments in this section could also be applied to the Special Master's decision not to
include charity as a collateral source.
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In the tort setting the case against collateral offsets for personal sav
ings or wealth might begin something like this: It has long been con
sidered fundamental to the conception of tort law that tort damage
awards approximate the harm caused to the plaintiff by the defen
dant.63 Thus, whether one subscribes to a corrective justice view of
tort law (in which tort law is understood as correcting wrongful
harms) or a deterrence view (in which tort law is intended primarily to
internalize costs and minimize the costs of accidents), damage awards
are supposed to equal the harm caused. Most tort theorists would
agree that it is inappropriate to adjust tort awards based on the in
jured plaintiff's savings or wealth except insofar as such an adjustment
is necessary to measure the actual amount of the loss sustained.
Moreover, if we were to begin treating various forms of wealth as col
lateral offsets in tort cases, such a move would radically transform the
tort system.
This conclusion, however, is usually reached in discussions of the
role of distributive justice in traditional tort law, by which we mean a
tort regime in which collateral sources are not offset-in which the
traditional collateral source rule applies. It is with respect to those
majority jurisdictions that deterrence and corrective justice are
thought to be the leading (albeit competing) justifications of the tort
system. To reduce or offset tort awards in those jurisdictions to ac
count for the wealth of the plaintiff would indeed work a radical trans
formation of tort law, from a system of corrective justice or deterrence
to one of wealth redistribution, which very few commentators (includ
ing us) would regard as advisable. But we are not talking about a tort
regime in which there are generally no collateral offsets; rather, we
are talking about jurisdictions (including the Fund) that, in an effort
to avoid overcompensation or "double-recovery," have already de
cided to adopt some collateral offsets-to depart from the traditional
collateral source rule. The only remaining question, and the one that
we focus on here, is whether to include offsets for savings or wealth
along with the other offsets.
Given the way we have framed the question, it is less clear, at least
on deterrence and corrective-justice grounds, what is wrong with
wealth offsets in tort law, which no more undermine the deterrence
and corrective-justice functions of tort law than do any other collat
eral offsets. As already discussed, collateral nonoffsets, together with
the subrogation principle, are essential to tort l aw's rleterrence func
tion ot shifting the costs of accidents from victims to injurers and their
63. This conclusion ignores arguments for the imposition of punitive d amages.
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liability insurers, at least in circumstances in which first-party insur
ance is present.64 A similar point could be made about the corrective
justice goal of tort law. Thus, the objective of maintaining the purity
of the deterrence or corrective j ustice functions of tort law would have
little purchase as an argument against wealth offsets. And the same
could be said of deterrence-based or corrective-justice based objec
tions to wealth offsets in the Fund context: That we are allowing col
lateral offsets at all suggests that deterrence and corrective justice are
not the goals of the Fund.
This conclusion seems right to us. As discussed above, the deter
rence justification for tort law does not seem to apply to the Fund, as
there is little reason to think of the Fund as a deterrent against future
terrorism. Moreover, although one might plausibly argue that the
Fund serves a corrective justice goal, if one takes the view that the
federal government was morally culpable for the September 1 1th at
tacks, such a vision of the Fund does not fit well with its actual design,
which offers no opportunity for fact-finding as to the culpability of the
government (as a tort suit would allow with respect to a tort defen
dant), but rather focuses only on the questions (a) whether the claim
ant qualifies for a payment from the Fund, and (b) what the amount
of that payment ought to be.
But if deterrence and corrective justice are not the point of the
Fund-as they appear not to be the main point of tort law in collateral
non-offset jurisdictions,65-what is the point? Presumably, it is simply
compensation. But what does that mean? Are we to view the Fund as
a substitute for, or an enhancement of, the level of life insurance that
rational well-informed individuals would purchase for themselves or
their households? On this view, the design of the Fund generally, and
the design of the collateral source offsets specifically, should be evalu
ated on the basis of their correspondence with that hypothetical level
of life insurance. This application of the consumer sovereignty norm,
borrowed from the fields of contracts law and products liability law,
might be said to embody a "compensation-based" or "insurance64. As far as we know, none of the jurisdictions that have adopted a collateral offset approach
have included savings or wealth in their definition of collateral sources. Rather, they limit the
collateral offsets, as Congress has done in the Fund context, to payments that compensate di
rectly for (or "indemnify") the loss in question, such as insurance benefits or special government
benefits. The reason for this may simply be that those jurisdictions simply do not want to take
on the additional administrative headache of determining what counts as savings and what does
not, and how much of savings gets offset.
65. We are not saying that in collateral-offset jurisdictions tort law serves no deterrence or
corrective-justice goals, only that deterrence and corrective-justice in such jurisdictions are less
important than in traditional collateral non-offset jurisdictions. We return to this q ualification in
Part IV of this Article.

2003]

THE GENIE AND THE BOTTLE

619

based" view of how the Fund awards should be calculated.66 On this
view, full compensation calls for the level of payment that an individ
ual would have bargained for in the insurance market, absent market
failures of various sorts.
To apply this framework to the precise question at hand-whether
to offset awards by savings or wealth-we need to ask, in effect,
whether and to what extent individuals or households purchasing life
insurance under conditions of high information, low transaction costs
and relatively few cognitive biases, would decide to adopt wealth off
sets on their own. Put differently, to what extent would or do life
insurance purchasers treat their own or the household's wealth as a
form of self-insurance against the loss of a wage earner? We can im
agine, for example, that households with a great deal of wealth rela
tive to income might only partially insure the human capital of a
household earner ( or, for the truly wealthy, not insure at all) , prefer
ring instead to absorb the financial loss of an earner's income rather
than to spend money on life insurance premiums. Thus, it is easy to
imagine that Bill Gates, despite his enormous earning power, might
not feel the need to purchase a term life policy. For such families,
including savings as a collateral offset would make some sense, on
grounds of consumer sovereignty, in the sense that the government
provided life insurance would approximate the amount of life insur
ance that the family would have purchased for itself. Along the same
lines, we might suppose that households for whom human capital is
the largest household asset would be less likely to self-insure, as there
is too little wealth to absorb the loss, and thus such households would
be more likely to prefer a policy that provides full replacement of
human capital. For such households, an offset for savings would be
contrary to consumer sovereignty.
But these are mere speculations. Thus, the most obvious problem
with a serious attempt to apply the consumer sovereignty principle in
this way to the design of collateral source offsets for the Fund ( or
wherever such offsets are used ) is -that we cannot know, without a
great deal of empirical research into consumer behavior, whether indi
viduals or households, when buying life insurance, implicitly or explic
itly reduce the amount of coverage they purchase to account for their
household wealth. It remains an open question as to what extent
households, when insuring the human capital of household earners,
tend to self-insure. But even if such data on consumer spending deci66. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE
L.J. 353. 355-59 ( 1 988) (discussing the consumer sovereignty norm in contracts literature and
applying it to products liability law).
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sions were available, and even if the Special Master had wanted to
adopt such a fine-tuned consumer-sovereignty approach, the effort
would have been rendered almost impossible by the inherent difficul
ties of modeling the "optimal" amount of life insurance, the amount
that a "rational" household would purchase. Relatedly, given all of
the reasons why households are believed to purchase too little life in
surance on the private market (myopia, aversion to planning for their
own death), empirical evidence of private life insurance purchases
may be more misleading than informative.
The biggest problem, though, facing collateral offsets for savings at
least in the Fund context (especially, but not only, if such offsets were
made for some claimants but not others) would have been the political
one. As a political matter, collateral sources had to have a uniform
meaning across all claimants, even if a fine-tuned life insurance con
sumer-sovereignty approach would have called for some variation
based on varying consumer preferences. And just as the Special
Master came under enormous pressure from the representatives of the
highest-income victims not to place an overall cap on awards, the po
litical pressure not to adjust the awards downward based on wealth
would have been immense.
One might also have advocated savings or wealth offsets to Fund
awards not on consumer sovereignty grounds-which is consistent
with a "compensation based" view of the Fund-but on grounds of
distributive justice, which is not. That is to say, if the Fund is under
stood more as a type of ad hoc social insurance than as a substitute for
the tort regime, making the awards needs-based rather than purely
compensation-based is somewhat more defensible, at least as an initial
matter. After all, the Social Security program-including the feder
ally provided life insurance available through the Social Security Sur
vivorship program-has an obvious needs-based element to the
calculation of benefits. For example, if a qualified wage-earner in a
household dies, the Social Security Survivorship benefits paid to the
surviving spouse are reduced as the survivor's income rises above cer
tain thresholds.67 Likewise, the earned income tax credit, beyond a

67. Soc. SEc. ADMIN., Pue. No. 05-10069, How WORK AFFECTS YOUR BENEFITS (1999). In
general, if the surviving spouse is under the age of 65, for every $2 he or she earns in excess of
$9,600, $1 in survivorship benefits is lost. Id. at 2.
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point, decreases as one earns more income;68 and many social welfare
programs historically have been designed to be "means tested."69
A distributive-justice or needs-based rationale for offsetting Fund
awards with personal savings, however, would also have faced enor
mous political opposition, for the reasons already mentioned. The
rhetoric of full compensation, which is directly inconsistent with this
needs-based approach, took hold fairly quickly after the September
11th attacks, in part out of sympathy for the families, and in part, as
mentioned, to make the Fund alternative an attractive alternative to
tort law, and thus, to help stabilize the reeling airline companies.
Moreover, the practical difficulties and associated administrative costs
of applying a means-tested approach via the collateral-source offsets
would have been enormous. If the September 11th Fund had been,
instead of a one-time ad hoc system of compensation for a single
event, a new ongoing social insurance program-a new form of gener
ally available government-provided life insurance-means-testing of
some sort would have been much more likely, not only in the collat
eral-source offsets but in the size of the initial awards as well. But
that, of course, is not what the Fund was designed to be. Rather, the
Fund is a more or less one-time program to cover the losses arising
out of a single event. If, however, events such as September 11th be
come more routine, we would expect less generous benefits gener
ally,70 but also a greater likelihood of wealth-adjusted collateral
offsets, or something similar, although again we are speculating.
In sum, although we agree with the Special Master's decision not to
include savings or personal wealth in the definition of collateral
sources for the Fund, a decision that seems also to be squarely within
the intent of Congress, we believe that the case against a means-tested
or need-based definition of collateral offsets is more complicated than
has previously been recognized. And although the task of drawing the
line between savings and insurance (and between charity and insur
ance) may not always be easy, it is an inevitable byproduct of a com
pensation-based approach.

68. I.RC. § 32 (2000); see also, Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limita
tions of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995).
69. Examples of such programs include, among many others, foodstamps, Section 8 housing
subsidies, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ( which replaced Aid to Families
with Dependent Children) , and Social Security's Supplemental Security Income.
70. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 58.
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The Nonoffset/Subrogation Alternative Revisited: The Make
Whole Issue and Delegating the Collateral Source Question

Because of the inherent difficulty of defining collateral sources,
there might have been a temptation in the design of the Fund to go
with the nonoffset/subrogation alternative from traditional tort juris
dictions. Again, this would not have been for deterrence or corrective
justice reasons, but simply to avoid the difficulty of deciding what
would be and what would not be considered a collateral source. How
ever, the nonoffset/subrogation approach has its own problems of
line-drawing. For example, the collateral-nonoffset approach would
have required either Congress or the Special Master to identify the
life insurance, or savings sources, or both, that would have been
granted a subrogation right and under what circumstances. Here the
critical decisions would · not only have been the identification of
sources, but resolution of the difficult make-whole issue, discussed
above,7 1 that often arises in the context of subrogation. One way of
putting the make-whole question is this: Would a collateral source's
subrogation right be automatic, or would it be applicable only to pre
vent overcompensation?
To see the importance of this question, consider a simple example.
Suppose there are two identically situated households. Each is a fam
ily of four, with two parents (both of whom are wage earners) and two
small children; and the income and wealth levels of the two house
holds, again, are the same. The only difference is that the two house
holds carry different amounts of life insurance on the primary earners
within the households. Household One carries a $1 million policy on
the life of the primary earner, which we will assume would completely
replace the insured's lost earning power. Household Two, however,
with an identical earning potential, carries only a $20,000 policy on the
primary earner, which, under our assumptions, would be substantially
undercompensatory.
Now consider the effects of giving the life insurers in this example a
subrogation right. One can easily imagine concluding that granting
Household One's life insurer a subrogation right would make perfect
sense, because it would help to prevent overcompensation in circum
stances involving multiple sources of recovery. However, this conclu
sion works only because we have assumed adequate coverage in the
first place. Recall that it was the general tendency to underinsure
household wage-earners that served as the primary rationale for not
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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allowing subrogation of life insurance in the first place.72 If we con
sider the case of the underinsured wage-earner, of which Household
Two is an egregious example, we can see that granting the life insurer
a subrogation right can contribute to, or at least fail to ameliorate, the
undercompensation of the surviving members of the household. In
such a situation, if there were some other source of recovery besides
the $20,000 policy, the life insurer for Household Two could seek re
imbursement first, before the surviving members of the family.
It is a familiar fact of insurance law that this problem can be policed
by a rule requiring that the claimant be made whole before any collat
eral source could exercise its subrogation right. And such a rule
would presumably have been necessary if Congress and the Special
Master had taken the nonoffset/subrogation route. But a make-whole
rule is no panacea. Enforcing such a rule would require some form of
adjudication or at least some standard for determining the amount of
the claimant's total "loss." The Special Master's rules seem to presup
pose that he will pay all claimants their "full" economic and
noneconomic losses, thus circumventing this issue. But this presuppo
sition may prove to be questionable when he pays particular claims,
and there is certainly no reason to believe that future compensation
arrangements will always pay "full" losses. Consequently, whenever a
collateral nonoffset approach is used, the conditions under which sub
rogation by collateral sources is permitted will have to be addressed
and the make-whole issue resolved.
If Congress had decided to adopt the nonoffset approach, it might
have been tempted to resolve the make-whole issue by avoiding or
delegating it. That is to say, as an alternative to adopting a mandatory
subrogation approach, Congress could have merely "authorized" life
insurers, pension funds, and similar sources to insert subrogation
rights into their policies or contracts and then left it to them and to the
courts to decide what these subrogation provisions would mean. But
then the job of deciding how to deal with the make-whole issue (and,
as a result, what offsets to require or not to require) would fall to the
insurers and the courts. Such a solution might have had some short
run political benefits, as Congress and the Special Master would not
have been directly responsible for answering the hard questions.
However, the questions would not have been avoided altogether.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that life insurers have never
found it in their interest to assert subrogation rights. This fact sug
gests that life insurers would be unlikely to start inserting subrogation
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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clauses now, even if they are specifically authorized to do so by stat
ute.73 Given this fact, we might view the collateral offsets for life in
surance prescribed by the Fund as simply the federal government's
way of taxing life insurers for part of the cost of September 11th com
pensation, under circumstances in which the life insurers would have
had to pay anyway under a nonoffset subrogation approach.
The approach Congress adopted, of course, contains an element of
unfairness for those families of victims who happened to have pur
chased adequate life insurance. Why are they being punished for hav
ing planned ahead? A solution to this concern might be to allow a
collateral offset-offset for the amount of life insurance premiums that
were paid by the September 1 1th victims or their families on the poli
cies during the life of the policy, up to September 1 1th. For victims
with outstanding life insurance policies, under this approach, it would
be as if the federal government had been paying the premiums all
along and thus were now, via the collateral offset, getting the benefit
of their bargain. Even this solution, however, would not be perfect.74
IV.

CONCLUSION

An important question raised by our analysis is whether the collat
eral offset provision in the Fund creates a precedent that will have a
broader impact on the future of personal injury and compensation
law. That is certainly possible, perhaps even likely. We can easily im
agine policymakers following the example of the Fund and adding
broad collateral offsets that include life insurance to various existing
compensation regimes or to new regimes that are adopted to respond
to new sources of harm. Such a possibility provides the sense in which
the genie may be out of the bottle: When a policy tool of this sort is
used for the first time, especially in such a public manner, it is likely to
be used again, at least in similar situations (such as future terror at
tacks) and perhaps in situations involving other types of losses and
other compensation regimes as well.
There are, of course, sound reasons not to use the collateral offset
approach in some settings, settings in which there is some realistic
hope that the threat of tort liability can have a significant deterrent
73. Given that no one currently has a subrogation clause, the reason for this phenomenon
might be a version of the first-mover problem; no insurer would wan t to be known as the first
company to insert such a right in their policies.
74. For example, there would be administrative costs with respe ct to outstanding life insur
ance policies that involved some element of savings (that is, cash-value policies), as it would be
necessary under this approach to distinguish the pure insurance portion of the premium from the
portion that went to cash value.

2003]

THE GENIE A ND THE BOTTLE

625

effect. In such settings, a nonoffset approach, coupled with subroga
tion, would make more sense, in which case, the question of defining
collateral sources becomes moot (although the make-whole issue re
mains). One of the main insights of our analysis, however, is that
when deterrence is not an issue (or not the primary issue), and hence,
the primary issue is how to provide adequate compensation, a collat
eral offset approach may indeed make sense, but there will remain
difficult and interesting questions.
For example, is full compensation to be the exclusive norm in the
compensation regime, or is there room for need-consciousness or
means-testing in such an approach? The conventional wisdom has
long been that issues of wealth redistribution are best handled exclu
sively by the tax-and-transfer system and never through other com
pensation systems, especially not the tort system; however, that
conventional wisdom assumes that the tort system is primarily about
deterrence; when the tort system is mainly about deterrence and in
centives, introducing a redistributive role for tort law produces consid
erable distortion. However, if the deterrence and corrective-functions
are removed from tort law-via collateral offsets, say-then the ques
tion of whether to pursue a need-based or redistributive approach
gains new strength.75 Thus, a question that has not previously been
addressed, and which our analysis suggests deserves some attention, is
whether such tort jurisdictions that have adopted the collateral-offset
approach should include some aspect of savings or wealth in their col
lateral offsets.
We do not take a position on that question here, although we sus
pect that the administrative problems that such an innovation would
entail would not justify the small improvement in distributional eq
uity. Also, we should emphasize that the case for a needs-based ap
proach is stronger in the Fund context, in which deterrence and
corrective justice seem to be entirely irrelevant, than in the context of
collateral-offset tort jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions, of course,
there is still some, albeit reduced, deterrence and corrective-justice
function served by tort law. Plaintiffs in those jurisdictions still bring
75. See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules,
and Insurance, 56 TAx L. REV. 157, 196 (2003) (arguing that, if because of cognitive biases
individuals ignore tort law and thus tort law has no deterrence significance, the redistributive
role for tort law might be more easily defended). There is of course a good practical fairness
argument for leaving all income or wealth redistribution to regimes that are relatively compre
hensive. Comprehensiveness is one of the appeals of the tax-and-transfer regime, and the lack of
comprehensiveness is one of the complaints against the tort system, as methods of reducing
wealth or income inequality. Id. at 185-88. For a series of responses to this argument, see gener
ally id.
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tort suits and sometimes recover damages from tortfeasors. Why?
One reason is the availability of tort damages that are not offset by
collateral sources-namely, pain-and-suffering damages and punitive
awards. Another is the expressive or symbolic function that individu
als sometimes attribute to their "day in court." Our point here, then,
is not that collateral-source tort jurisdictions should immediately
adopt need-based tort awards; rather, our point is that, because the
deterrence and corrective justice functions of tort law are reduced in
those jurisdictions, the case for need-based tort awards (or the case
for including wealth in the definition of collateral sources) is stronger
than has previously been recognized. Though it is still not as strong as
in the Fund context, in which deterrence is truly irrelevant.
In any event, the adoption of the Fund has put these questions
squarely on the policy table, and they are questions that will recur not
only after any future terror attacks, but also in connection with any
new compensation regime that we can imagine. By breaking new
ground in its prescription of offsets from Fund compensation for life
insurance benefits, the Fund puts at issue an entire area that has until
now been off limits to debate. By placing the proper role of life insur
ance recoveries at issue, the Fund has done what happens periodically
in the tort and insurance systems. It has raised questions about the
fundamental purposes we seek to achieve in providing compensation
to the victims of personal injury and illness.

